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It is known that quantum scissors, as non-deterministic amplifiers, can enhance the performance of Gaussian-
modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) in noisy and long-distance regimes of op-
eration. Here, we extend this result to a non-Gaussian CV-QKD protocol with discrete modulation. We show
that, by using a proper setting, the use of quantum scissors in the receiver of such discrete-modulation CV-QKD
protocols would allow us to achieve positive secret key rates at high loss and high excess noise regimes of opera-
tion, which would have been otherwise impossible. This also keeps the prospect of running discrete-modulation
CV-QKD over CV quantum repeaters alive.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising technology
for establishing private cryptographic keys between two users
[1–3]. The security of QKD, which was first introduced in
1984 [4], is based on restricting the eavesdropper by the laws
of quantum mechanics rather than her ability to efficiently
solve certain mathematical problems of high computational
complexity [5]. If properly implemented, this makes QKD se-
cure against most powerful computers now and in the future.
Quantum key distribution can be implemented using a num-
ber of optical techniques, the most well-known genre of which
relies on encoding bits of private information on the polar-
ization of single photons (or any other discrete degrees of
freedom of optical signals). Continuous-variable QKD (CV-
QKD) protocols, such as the Gaussian-modulated technique
proposed by Grosshans and Grangier in 2002 (GG02) [6, 7],
are introduced as an alternative class, where coherent com-
munication techniques, such as homodyne or heterodyne de-
tection, are employed [8–10]. In a CV-QKD protocol, data is
encoded on the quadratures of an optical field [6, 7, 11–13].
The progress in implementing CV-QKD protocols has been
noteworthy in the past few years [14, 15]. This has been fa-
cilitated by removing some of the security challenges arisen
from regenerating the local oscillator [16–18] at the receiver,
and by the involvement of some commercial actors [19] to
further deploy such technologies. Despite this progress, it
is generally believed that CV-QKD is perhaps a good option
for short-distance low-loss links [20], while discrete-variable
QKD could be more suitable for long distances. This is partly
because of the difficulties with implementing highly efficient
reconciliation algorithms for CV-QKD, as well as the less de-
veloped quantum repeater paradigms for CV systems.
The scope for long-distance CV-QKD has, however,
changed with some recent developments in the field. For in-
stance, one solution is to use non-deterministic amplification
[21–24]. It has been shown that by using a realistic imple-
mentation of an amplification device, e.g., a quantum scissor
(QS) [24–26], the security distance of Gaussian-modulated
CV-QKD protocols can be increased. Using quantum scis-
sors, or similar ideas, the first generation of CV quantum re-
peaters have then been proposed [27–29]. Another technique
that can potentially improve the rate-versus-distance behavior
in CV-QKD protocols is to use a non-Gaussian discrete mod-
ulation [30–34]. It is generally perceived that, especially, at
low signal-to-noise ratio levels, which we have to deal with
at long distances, it would be easier to design an error correc-
tion scheme for discrete-modulation encoding as opposed to
the Gaussian one [31, 35].
In this paper, we consider all above enabling factors within
a single setup to study the rate-versus-distance behavior for a
discrete-modulation CV-QKD system that uses quantum scis-
sors at its receiver. This is effectively the main building block
in the quantum repeater setup proposed in Ref. [27], which is
now used for discrete-modulation CV-QKD. A realistic anal-
ysis of our setup could then be used to assess the practi-
cality of the proposed repeater setups. It has already been
shown that, by using an ideal non-deterministic linear ampli-
fier (NLA) at the receivers side, one can increase the maxi-
mum transmission distance and tolerable excess noise of the
quadrature-phase-shift-keying (QPSK) protocol [23]. How-
ever, a study that accounts for a realistic NLA, such as a
quantum scissor, is missing. This is important, because one
of the key incentives for using discrete-modulation CV-QKD
is its similarity with existing coherent optical communications
systems, which possibly makes its adoption and implementa-
tion more straightforward. It is also important to consider a
physical realization of the NLA in our system, as opposed to
measurement-based ones [36–38], because otherwise the sys-
tem cannot be used in a repeater setup. Measurement-based
NLAs often offer lower key rates when used in CV-QKD se-
tups [39], which is another reason for considering the physical
deployment of a QS in our setup. For further clarification on
this matter, interested readers are referred to the discussions
in Ref. [24].
The security analysis of discrete-modulation CV-QKD has
turned out to be more challenging than its Gaussian counter-
part. The reported analysis in Ref. [30] relies on the linearity
of the channel for its security. But, the authors admit that this
is not an easy condition to verify. In order to rectify this prob-
lem, in Ref. [31], they come up with a modified scheme in
which they can relax the assumption on the channel linearity
by requiring Alice to send three types of signals: Gaussian
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2modulated ones for channel estimation, discrete-modulation
ones for key generation, and a range of decoy states to con-
ceal the discrepancy between the latter two in the eyes of an
eavesdropper. The decoy states would effectively, make the
modulated signals to look Gaussian, which makes the security
analysis more manageable. This approach, however, to a large
extent, takes away the practical aspects of discrete-modulation
CV-QKD. Very recently, new analyses have emerged, which
rely on numerical optimization of the key rate based on certain
constraints obtained from the measurement results [40, 41]. In
our setup, we have another complication that results from us-
ing the QS, which is non-deterministic. This would further
make the channel non-Gaussian, which implies that the op-
timal attack by an eavesdropper could also be non-Gaussian.
By carefully engineering our system to remain close to Gaus-
sian, we can, however, obtain a reasonable estimation of the
secret key rate by restricting the eavesdropper to Gaussian
attacks. This allows us to use a thermal-loss model for the
channel, for which we calculate the key rate. We show how
the performance of our non-Gaussian CV-QKD system is en-
hanced in this case, especially in high-loss and high-excess
noise regimes.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe the system under study. In Sec. III, we present the key
rate analysis of the QS-assisted CV-QKD protocol with non-
Gaussian modulation. We then discuss our numerical results
in Sec. IV and conclude our paper in Sec. V.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we present our proposed QS-amplified CV-
QKD protocol with discrete modulation and its equivalent
entanglement-based (EB) version. Both schemes are depicted
in Fig. 1. Different components of the system are described
below.
A. Modulation and Detection
In a conventional non-Gaussian/discrete modulation proto-
col, a particular finite constellation of coherent states is con-
sidered and used for encoding data. A constellation of four
and eight coherent states are the well-known cases [23, 30–
33]. In this study, we focus on the QPSK protocol. We assume
that the sender, Alice (A), sends her prepared signals to the
receiver, Bob (B), via a quantum channel similarly to that of
Ref. [30]. In our proposed protocol, however, Bob is equipped
with a single QS in order to amplify the received signal. Bob
applies the QS operation just before his homodyne detection,
which are both owned and handled by him. The homodyne
measurement results are recorded whenever the QS operation
is successful.
More precisely, the prepare and measure (P&M) version of
the protocol runs as follows. First, Alice randomly chooses a
coherent state from the set {|αk〉 = |αe(2k+1)ipi/4〉}3k=0, with
α ∈ R+, and sends it to Bob through a quantum channel; see
Fig. 1(a). Such a constellation can be generated by rotation of
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FIG. 1. System description. (a) Schematic view of discrete-
modulation CV-QKD protocol equipped with a quantum scissor as
part of its receiver. Here, the four yellow circles at the sender side
represent the constellation of the four coherent states used at the en-
coder. (b) The entanglement-based CV-QKD protocol equivalent to
(a). The quantum channel is modeled by the equivalent excess noise
at the transmitter side, represented by εtm, and its transmissivity T .
|Ψ〉01, QS, Hom and P boxes, respectively, represent the bipartite
entangled state in Eq. (1), a probabilistic quantum scissor as seen in
Fig. 2, the homodyne detection and projective measurement modules
in {|ψk〉0} basis.
a coherent state in position-momentum phase space. The pa-
rameter α can be optimized to give the maximum secret key
rate. In addition, we assume αk = (xAk + ipAk)/2, k =
0, . . . , 3, with real parameters xAk and pAk being chosen ran-
domly according to the following uniform probability mass
functions: fXA(xAk) = fPA(pAk) = 1/4. At the receiver,
Bob randomly measures one quadrature, x̂B = â
†
B + âB or
p̂B = i(â
†
B − âB), of the QS output using homodyne detec-
tion, where â†B represents the creation operator for the output
mode of the QS. The trusted parties, Alice and Bob, keep the
detection results only if the QS operation is successful in the
respective round; that is, only one of detectors D1 or D2, in
Fig. 2, clicks. By doing reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation, the parties can then obtain a common string of secret
bits.
In order to calculate the secret key generation rate, espe-
cially the Holevo information term, it is often easier to con-
sider the equivalent EB scheme, which is shown in Fig. 1(b).
In the EB version, instead of randomly choosing and sending
single-mode coherent states, Alice measures one mode of a
bipartite entangled state, and sends the other one to Bob. In
the Gaussian modulation case, the employed entangled state is
a two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state, and Alice mea-
surement is heterodyne detection. In the case of the QPSK
protocol, it has been shown that one can start with a TMSV
state, and apply a certain measurement to obtain the following
3state [31]
|Ψ〉01 =
3∑
k=0
√
λk |φk〉0|φk〉1
=
1
2
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉0|αk〉1, (1)
where
|φk〉 =
−α22√
λk
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n α
4n+k√
(4n+ k)!
|4n+ k〉
and
|ψk〉0 = 1
2
3∑
m=0
e(2k+1)impi/4|φm〉0
are orthogonal non-Gaussian states, with λ0,2 =
e−α
2/2
(
cosh(α2) ± cos(α2))/2 and λ1,3 =
e−α
2/2
(
sinh(α2) ± sin(α2))/2. The subscripts 0 and
1 refer to optical modes represented by â0 and â1, respec-
tively. In the procedure described in Ref. [31], there is a
chance that instead of the state in Eq. (1), we end up with
a decoy state. In this paper, we focus only on the key
generation part, which results from the state in Eq. (1), and
do not consider the parameter estimation task, for which
we should either send Gaussian modulated states [31], or
use numerical techniques [40]. In the end, the equivalence
of P&M and EB schemes of the protocols is obtained via a
proper projective measurement P̂ in {|ψk〉0}, k = 0, . . . , 3,
basis.
B. Quantum Channel
The parties are assumed to use a thermal-loss channel with
transmittivity T and an excess noise ε. A potential model for
such a channel is given by a beam splitter, with transmissivity
T , that mixes Alice’s signals and the eavesdropper’s thermal
state, given by the following expression:
ρ̂th =
∫
d2β
e−
|β|2
ε/2
piε/2
|β〉âN〈β|, (2)
where âN is the annihilation operator corresponding to the
noise port, and d2β = d<βd=β. The equivalent excess noise
at the input to the channel is then given by εtm = (1−T )ε/T .
In principle, The parties cannot tell what kind of channel they
have without proper parameter estimation. The assumption
of a thermal-loss channel corresponds to the case of a Gaus-
sian attack, which may not be optimal for our non-Gaussian
system. However, as long as the system does not deviate con-
siderably from the Gaussian framework, the results obtained
will provide us with a reasonable estimate of the potential key
rate that can be obtained by a more rigorous analysis [42]. We
use the above model to calculate the relevant parameters of
the covarince matrix when QSs are in use.
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FIG. 2. The schematic view of a quantum scissor. Here, we assume
that a ready-to-shoot ideal single-photon source (SPS) is in use, and
that the single-photon detectors have unity efficiencies. The QS am-
plification gain is defined as g =
√
(1− µ)/µ .
C. Quantum Scissors
Quantum scissors are at the core of the NLA module pro-
posed by Ralph and Lund [26]. A single QS has two beam
splitters in its setup, one of which is balanced while the other
has a transmittance µ; see Fig. 2. The 50:50 beam splitter
couples the incoming signal to a single photon that has gone
through the imbalanced beam splitter. A click on exactly one
of detectors D1 and D2 would herald success of the QS. We
note that an on-demand ideal single photon source assumed
here in our analysis.
Here we obtain the output state of the QS, upon success-
ful operation, for an input state ρ̂ = 14
∑3
k=0 |αk〉〈αk| to the
thermal-loss channel described in Sec. II B. In order to do so,
we use the results reported in Ref. [24], in which the output
state of such a setup for an arbitrary coherent state at the input
has been derived. We then obtain
ρ̂QS(α) =a(α)|0〉1〈0|+ c(α)|1〉1〈1|, (3)
where ρ̂QS(α) is the density matrix at the output of the QS
upon successful operation and
a(α) = 2µ[2F (2F+1)+T |α|
2]
(2F+1)3P PS(α)
e−
T |α|2
2F+1
c(α) = 2(1−µ)
P PS(α)
(
e
−T |α|
2
2F+1
2F+1 − e
−T |α|
2
2F
4F
)
,
(4)
with F = 12 +
1
4Tεtm. In Eq. (4),
PPS(α) =
2[(2F + 1)2 − µ(2F + 1) + µT |α|2]
(2F + 1)3
e−
T |α|2
2F+1
− 1− µ
2F
e−
T |α|2
2F
=Psucc(α)/2, (5)
where Psucc(α) is the success probability for the QS.
An interesting observation from Eq. (3) is that the output
state of the QS is non-Gaussian. This is not just because we
have used non-Gaussian modulation, but even for a single co-
herent state at the input, as discussed in Ref. [24], the out-
put state is in the subspace spanned by {|0〉, |1〉}. There are
two implications for this behavior. First, the QS amplifica-
tion cannot be noise free, as in an ideal NLA, but the amount
4of noise can vary based on the input signal and the amplifi-
cation gain. Further, this non-Gaussianity can complicate the
security analysis of the protocol. In our work, we manage this
additional complexity by restricting the eavesdropper (Eve) to
collective Gaussian attacks [43], as discussed before.
The non-Gaussianity of the channel manifests itself in the
statistics that we can obtain from Bob’s homodyne measure-
ment. In particular, using similar techniques as in Ref. [24],
the output probability distribution of x̂B-quadrature can be
calculated as follows:
fXB (xB) = tr[ρ̂QS(α)|xB〉〈xB |]
=
[
a(α) + 2c(α)x2B
]e−x2B√
pi
, (6)
with x̂B |xB〉 = xB |xB〉. As can be seen in Eq. (6), similar to
the Gaussian-modulation case, the output probability distribu-
tion function is composed of a Gaussian and a non-Gaussian
term. In the regime, where a(α)  c(α), we are very close
to a fully Gaussian system. For this to happen α needs to
be small. In the other extreme, when c(α)  a(α), we get a
bimodal form for the output distribution, which is clearly non-
Gaussian. Similarly, we can work out the conditional output
probability distribution:
fXB (xB |xAk) = tr[ρ̂QS,c(xAk)|xB〉〈xB |], (7)
where
ρ̂QS,c(xAk) =ac(xAk)|0〉1〈0|+ bc(xAk)|0〉1〈1|
+ b∗c(xAk)|1〉1〈0|+ cc(xAk)|1〉1〈1| (8)
is the conditional QS output state if Alice transmitted X
quadrature, through the thermal-loss channel, is xAk and de-
tector D1 has clicked. In this case,
ac(xAk) =
2µ
(
4F (2F+1)+T (α2+2x2k)
)
(2F+1)3P PSc (xAk)
e−
T (α2+2x2k)
2(2F+1)
bc(xAk) = − 2
√
µ(1−µ)T xk
(2F+1)2P PSc (xAk)
e−
T (α2+2x2k)
2(2F+1)
cc(xAk) = 1− ac(xAk)
(9)
and
PPSc (xAk) =
2(2F + 1)2 − 2µ(2F + 1) + µT (α2 + 2x2k)
(2F + 1)3
× e−
T (α2+2x2k)
2(2F+1) − 1− µ
2F
e−
T (α2+2x2k)
4F . (10)
We will later use the above expressions in order to calculate
the mutual information between the parties.
III. SECRET KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the key rate analysis for our QS-
equipped QKD system. We calculate the secret key generation
rate for our system under the assumption that the eavesdrop-
per is limited to Gaussian attacks. In this case, we can assume
that the effective channel between the parties is a thermal-loss
channel as we described in Sec. II B. Note that the key rate ob-
tained in this case is not necessarily an exact lower bound on
the key rate because the optimal attack by and eavesdropper
can be non-Gaussian. As it has pointed out in Refs. [24, 42],
however, the key rate obtained in our case is expected to be a
close approximation to a true lower bound on the key rate.
In the asymptotic limit of many runs of the protocol, the
secret key rate of a CV-QKD protocol under collective attack
is given by [12]
K = βIAB − χEB , (11)
where β, IAB , and χEB are, respectively, the reconciliation
efficiency, the mutual information between the parties, and the
leaked/accessible information to Eve when reverse reconcili-
ation is used. However, since the QS is a non-deterministic
operation, the key rate should be multiplied by the average
probability of success, Psucc(α), where all possible inputs are
considered in the averaging. Therefore, the secret key rate
reads as follows
KQS ≥ Psucc(α)(βIAB − χEB). (12)
In our protocol, we discard data associated to the unsuccessful
events and use only the post-selected data in order to produce
a secret string of bits. In the following, we first derive the
exact value for IAB , in Sec. III A, and an upper bound for
χEB , in Sec. III B, for the thermal-loss channel.
A. Mutual Information
By definition, the mutual information of two random vari-
ables XA and XB is the difference between the entropy func-
tion H(XB) and the conditional entropy H(XB |XA):
IAB = H(XB)−H(XB |XA), (13)
where
H(XB) =
∫
dxB fXB (xB) log2
1
fXB (xB)
(14)
and
H(XB |XA) = 1
4
3∑
k=0
∫
dxB fXB (xB |xAk) log2
1
fXB (xB |xAk)
.
(15)
Functions fXB (xB) and fXB (xB |xAk) are given in Eqs. (6)
and (7), using which and the above equations, we numeri-
cally calculate the mutual information. We note that the input
quadrature is a discrete random variable whereas the output
is, in principle, continuous.
B. Holevo Information
We upper bound the leaked information, χEB , by calcu-
lating the Holevo term for a Gaussian channel with the same
5co-variance matrix (CM) as that of our system [44, 45]. In
order to find the CM, we first need to find the bipartite state
between Alice mode â0 and Bob mode b̂3 for the proposed
QPSK setup in Fig. 3. In doing so, we let mode â1 of the state
in Eq. (1) to propagate through the noisy quantum channel,
which we model via a beam splitter, with transmissivity T ,
which couples Alice’s signal to the thermal state in Eq. (2),
and subsequently undergoes the QS operation. Quantum scis-
sors involve a measurement as they are successful if only one
of their detectors clicks. We define measurement operator
M̂ = (1− |0〉1〈0|)⊗ |0〉2〈0|, corresponding to a click on de-
tector D1 and no click on D2, where 1 represents the identity
operator for optical mode entering D1, and |0〉1 and |0〉2 are
vacuum states corresponding to, respectively, optical modes
b̂1 and b̂2.
In order to calculate the joint state of modes â0 and b̂3, we
follow the same procedure as in Ref. [24] that relies on find-
ing input-output characteristic functions for the module Γ in
Fig. 3. Upon a successful QS operation, i.e., M̂ measurement,
we obtain
ρ̂03 =
1
4PPS
3∑
k=0
3∑
l=0
|ψk〉0〈ψl| ⊗ Ω̂kl3 , (16)
where
Ω̂kl3 =
∫
d2ξ3
pi
ζklA (ξ3)D̂N (̂b3, ξ3) (17)
is the state that Bob measures, with D̂N (̂b, ξ) = eξb̂
†
e−ξ
∗b̂
being the normally-ordered displacement operator of mode b̂.
In Eq. (17),
ζklA (ξ3) =
∫
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
χklA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) (18)
where, for |αk〉1〈αl| as the input state,
χklA (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) =e
−F |ξ1−ξ2|2e
√
T
2 [α
∗
l (ξ1−ξ2)−αk(ξ∗1−ξ∗2 )]
× e−µ2 |ξ1+ξ2+
√
2 gξ3|2e−
1−µ
2 |ξ1+ξ2−
√
2 /gξ3|2
× (piδ2(ξ1)− 1)
(
1− µ
2
|ξ1 + ξ2 +
√
2 gξ3|2
)
(19)
is the antinormally-ordered characteristic function of the out-
put states in Fig. 3 after tracing over the noise mode b̂N, which
belongs to a potential eavesdropper. Also, success probability
for measurement M̂ is given by
PPS =
1
4
3∑
k=0
∫
d2ξ1
pi
d2ξ2
pi
χkkA (ξ1, ξ2, 0)
=
1
4
3∑
k=0
ζkkA (0) = ζ
00
A (0), (20)
where ζklA (0) is given by Eq. (A2). This result exactly matches
that of the P&M scheme, given in Eq. (5). We remark that the
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FIG. 3. Entanglement-based version of the QS-amplified CV-QKD
scheme. The noisy quantum channel and the QS are considered as
a combined system, with input modes â1 − â3, and âN, and output
modes b̂1 − b̂3, and b̂N. The initial state of modes represented by
â0 − â1 is given by |Ψ〉01. The initial state of the modes represented
by operators â2, â3, and âN is, respectively, given by a single photon,
a vacuum, and the thermal state in Eq. (2).
total success probability is given by Psucc = 2PPS = 2ζ00A (0),
which also accounts for the case of D2 clicking and D1 not
clicking.
Next, in order to find a lower bound on the secret key rate,
following original works in [30, 31], we use the optimality of
Gaussian collective attacks in the asymptotic limit for a given
CM [44, 45]. Now that the bipartite state between Alice and
Bob is given by Eq. (16), we can work out the first and second
order moments in the CM, which is turned out to be in the
standard symplectic form [13] below:
VAB =
(
Vx1 Vxyσz
Vxyσz Vy1
)
, (21)
where 1 = diag(1, 1) and σz = diag(1,−1) are Pauli ma-
trices. In Appendix A, we derive the closed form expression
of the triplet (Vx, Vxy, Vy). Note that the obtained CM, in
the case of having a successful QS operation for vacuum state
at the input, i.e., when α = 0, results in identity CM, i.e.,
VAB = 1 ⊗ 1, as one would expect. Having found the CM,
one can then work out a bound on Holevo information using
the set of equations given in Appendix B.
An important feature of the CM in Eq. (21) is its cor-
relation parameter, defined as Z(QS)4 = Vxy/
√
T , which
characterizes the amount of correlation between the parties’s
quadratures upon a successful QS operation. Figure 4 com-
pares Z(QS)4 in our QS-based system with that of the no-QS
setup, Z4, in [31], and then compares both with that of the
Gaussian modulation case without (ZG) and with (Z
(NLA)
G )
an ideal NLA. In the case of Gaussian modulation with-
out an NLA, instead of |Ψ〉01, we start with a TMSV state
given by
√
1− λ2 ∑∞n=0 λn|n〉0|n〉1, for which the corre-
sponding CM is given by
(
(VA + 1)1 ZGσz
ZGσz (VA + 1)1
)
, with
ZG =
√
V 2A + 2VA , where VA = 2λ
2/(1 − λ2) is its corre-
sponding modulation variance. The parameter λ in the above
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FIG. 4. Correlation factor for the GG02 protocol (solid black),
the four coherent-state constellation without (solid blue) and with
(dashed red) a QS with amplification gain g = 2. The solid red curve
belongs to the TMSV state amplified via an ideal NLA (g = 2); see
text for more information. Here, the channel is assumed loss-less and
without any excess noise.
TMSV state would ideally change to gλ once one arm of the
TMSV state goes through an ideal NLA with gain g [26]. The
corresponding correlation term, Z(NLA)G , can then be calcu-
lated by
√
(V ′A)2 + 2V
′
A , where V
′
A = 2g
2λ2/(1− g2λ2).
Figure 4 compares the above four correlation parameters
as a function of VA. In the case of the QPSK protocol,
VA = 2α
2. We can see that Z(QS)4 overtakes the two no-NLA
curves at a VA around 0.15. This suggests that the amount
of correlation between the trusted parties signals has been en-
hanced by the use of a QS. This may imply that higher key
generation rates can be obtained in certain regimes of opera-
tion. One should, however, note that by increasing VA, hence
α, we may reduce the success probability of the QS system.
Furthermore, by increasing α, Eve’s Gaussian attack would
be further away from her optimal attack. We will discuss this
point in our numerical results when we optimize the secret
key rate over system parameters. One final interesting point
in Fig. 4 is that the correlation term for the ideal NLA is al-
ways better than the QS system. This may suggest that the
earlier analysis that rely on an ideal NLA may overestimate
what can be achieved with a realistic NLA system.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some numerical results for the
secret key rate of our QS-amplified QPSK CV-QKD system
and compare it with that of the no-QS protocol, and its Gaus-
sian modulated (GM) variants. To that end, we solve a dual
optimization problem. We find the maximum value for the
lower bound in Eq. (12) by optimizing over α, which speci-
fies the modulation variance, and the QS parameter g, which
specifies the QS amplification gain. In our numerical results,
for a channel with length L, we assume that T = 10−κL/10,
where κ = 0.2 dB/km is the loss factor for optical fibers.
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FIG. 5. Numerical results of the optimized secret key rate for
QS-equipped QPSK modulation CV-QKD protocol versus distance
(dashed lines), as compared to that of the protocol with no-QS (solid
lines). The ultimate thermal-loss PLOB bound [46] is shown at the
top.
Also, we nominally assume a reconciliation efficiency equal
to one and that Bob, upon successful QS events, uses an ideal
homodyne detection, with no electronic noise, to measure the
received signals.
Figure 5 shows the optimized key rates for the no-QS
[30, 31] and QS-equipped discrete modulation protocols ver-
sus distance. We observe that the behavior of the different
curves shown in Fig. 5 is very much akin to the Gaussian
modulation QS-equipped CV-QKD presented in Ref. [24]. In
particular, the QS-based systems are capable of beating their
no-QS counterparts after a certain distance, and considerably
increase the maximum security distance achievable by the un-
derlying QKD protocol. The crossover distance at an input
excess noise equal to 0 and 0.01 shot-noise units (SNU) is,
respectively, around 120 km and 110 km. In the case of
εtm = 0.05, the no-QS system has a very low reach, whereas,
by using a QS, the system can now provide positive secret key
rates at distances over 140 km. It can also be seen that the QS
based system offers either zero or very low secret key rates at
short distances. This, as pointed out in Ref. [24], can be be-
cause of the additional noise by the QS, especially, for large
inputs, which requires us to use much lower values of α that
would be used in the no-QS system. This could make the sig-
nal component of the signal, at short distances, less than the
excess noise part, hence resulting in no secure keys.
The opposite effect is seen at long distances where QS-
based systems are offering a key rate parallel to the funda-
mental bounds for secret key generation rate for a thermal-
loss channel (labeled by TL-PLOB). This is the bound given
in Eq. (23) of Ref. [46] at an equivalent mean thermal photon
number, n¯ = εtmT/(2(1 − T )), to our receiver excess noise
(here at εtm = 0.05) [47]. This extended security distance
suggests that once the input to the QS is low enough, which
is at long distances, the post-selection offered by the QS can
improve the signal-to-noise ratio to a level that positive secret
key rates are distillable. We have numerically verified that
positive key rates are indeed achievable for εtm < 0.09 for
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FIG. 6. Numerical results of the optimized secret key rate for discrete
modulation (DM) CV-QKD protocol versus distance, as compared
to that of the Gaussian modulated (GM) GG02 protocol with and
without a QS. The lower curve represents the result of optimized key
rate when α is capped at 0.5. The rates are obtained at β = 1.
the QS-based system.
The QS-equipped discrete modulation (DM) system in this
work seems to offer more resilience to excess noise and chan-
nel loss than its GM counterpart considered in Ref. [24]. For
instance, the maximum tolerable excess noise in the latter case
is around 0.06 SNU as compared to 0.09 SNU in the former
case. The secret key rate obtained at a high excess noise value
of 0.05 SNU is also higher for the DM versus GM case. This
has been shown in Fig. 6 where the secret key rate for both
systems, in the presence and absence of a QS, has been shown.
This result is, however, counter-intuitive, and must be taken
with caution. There is a fundamental difference between the
GM and DM case in that the latter is not a Gaussian one es-
pecially for large values of α. As shown in Fig. 7, the optimal
value of α is around 0.7 at εtm = 0.05. In our analysis, we
have, however, assumed that Eve is restricted to a Gaussian at-
tack, which will become less optimal as the input modulation
deviates further from a Gaussian one. What our numerical re-
sults would then suggest is that for a Gaussian Eve, it is better
to use a non-Gaussian modulation as this would make Eve’s
attack even less optimal.
If we want to obtain a more realistic account of what a non-
restricted Eve could achieve in our system, we should then cap
the choice of α in our optimization to a value that preserves
the Gaussianity of the input signal to some good extent. A
suggested cap for α is given in [40] to be around 0.5. The
lower curve in Fig. 6 shows the secret key rate under this con-
straint, while the corresponding optimal value of g is shown in
Fig. 7. It is now clear that the rate obtained for the DM case,
at β = 1, is lower than that of the GM case. The no-QS GM
system will, however, offer no positive key rate for β < 0.98,
which implies that, if one considers the more efficient recon-
ciliation techniques for DM systems, there would be regimes
of operation where the DM system outperforms the GM case.
Note that, as shown in Fig. 7, by capping α larger values of
gain is needed by the QS to achieve the optimal key rate.
Finally, we would like to comment on the suitability of
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FIG. 7. Optimized input amplitude (marked by circles) and op-
timized amplification gain (marked by diamonds) versus channel
length at εtm = 0.05 with an without a cap (0.5, not shown on the
graph) on α.
quantum scissors in CV quantum repeaters. One of the ob-
jectives of calculating the key rate of a QS equipped CV-QKD
system was the similarity of the setup to what was proposed,
as the main building block, in recent proposals for CV re-
peaters [27, 29]. Our intuition was that if a realistic QS could
not offer any advantage over the no-QS one, then the prospect
of a CV repeater that relies on such QS devices would also be
questionable. Our results suggest that there are regimes of op-
eration that QS-based systems offer some advantage. We are,
however, short of a convincing argument that such regimes of
operation would be those in which repeater systems could op-
erate as well. In fact, while our results keep the prospect of
functioning CV repeaters open, they also highlight the impor-
tance of considering all noise effects before jumping into any
conclusions. Our analysis could then be used to further study
the proposed repeater setups and assess how, in practice, they
can perform.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we studied the performance of a CV-QKD
system that used quadrature phase shift keying modulation
at the encoder and a certain optical state truncation device,
i.e., a quantum scissor, before its homodyne receiver. The ob-
jective was to find if and to what extent the use of QS, as a
non-deterministic amplifier, could improve the rate behavior
of the system at long distances. We showed that, by opti-
mizing the relevant system parameters, the QS-equipped sys-
tem could tolerate more excess noise than the no-QS discrete-
modulation system, and therefore could reach longer distances
at positive values of excess noise. This effect was similar
to that of a Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD system [24], but
in the discrete-modulation case we observed additional toler-
ance against excess noise if only Gaussian attacks are consid-
ered, or assume lower reconciliation efficiencies for the Gaus-
sian modulation case, as is often the case. This enables us to
extend the reach of CV-QKD systems provided that we sup-
8plement them with additional devices such as single-photon
sources and single-photon detectors [48, 49]. This, at first,
may sound counterproductive as it takes away some of the
practical advantages of CV-QKD systems. But, one should
note that these additional equipment are only needed at the
receiver end of the link, which, in a practical setup, can repre-
sent a shared network node in a quantum network. Moreover,
our analysis would specify the range of distances for which
the use of a quantum scissor could be beneficial. Over shorter
distances, one should still use a conventional system. Even-
tually quantum repeaters are needed to reach arbitrarily long
distances, for which the QS-based system studied here serves
as a building block.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Parameters of the co-variance matrix
In this section we calculate the triplet that quantifies the CM of our QS system, given in Eq. (21).
1. Variance at Alice’s side (Vx)
By definition, and using the bipartite state in Eq. (16), we have:
Vx = tr(ρ̂03x̂
2
0) =
1
4PPS
3∑
k=0
3∑
l=0
GklHkl, (A1)
where x̂0 = â0 + â
†
0 in Fig. 3, Gkl := tr(|ψk〉0〈ψl|x̂20) and Hkl := tr(Ω̂kl3 ) = ζklA (0). We then find that:
Hkl = ζ
kl
A (0) = akle
−Tαkα
∗
l
2F+1 − 1− µ
2F
e−
Tαkα
∗
l
2F
akl =
2
(2F + 1)3
(
(2F + 1)2 − µ(2F + 1) + µTαkα∗l
)
. (A2)
One can then use the set of identities in Eq. (A12) to work out the following expression:
Vx =1 +
α2
ζ00A (0)
(
δ1
[−A sinh( Tα2
2F + 1
) +B cosh(
Tα2
2F + 1
) + C sinh(
Tα2
2F
)
]
+ δ2
[
A cosh(
Tα2
2F + 1
)−B sinh( Tα
2
2F + 1
)− C cosh(Tα
2
2F
)
]
+ δ3
[−A sin( Tα2
2F + 1
) +B cos(
Tα2
2F + 1
) + C sin(
Tα2
2F
)
]
/2
− δ4
[
A cos(
Tα2
2F + 1
) +B sin(
Tα2
2F + 1
)− C cos(Tα
2
2F
)
]
/2
)
, (A3)
where
A =
2
(2F + 1)3
(
(2F + 1)2 − µ(2F + 1)
)
, B =
2µTα2
(2F + 1)3
, C =
1− µ
2F
δ1 =
λ0
λ1
+
λ2
λ3
, δ2 =
λ1
λ2
+
λ3
λ0
, δ3 =
λ0
λ1
− λ2
λ3
, δ4 =
λ1
λ2
− λ3
λ0
. (A4)
Note that for α = 0, Vx = 1 is obtained.
92. Variance at Bob’s side (Vy)
The variance at the receiver’s side can be computed as follows:
Vy = tr(ρ̂03x̂
2
3) =
1
4PPS
3∑
k=0
Lkk, (A5)
where, assuming ξ3 = z + it,
Lkk =tr(Ω̂
kk
3 x̂
2
3)
=− ζkkA (0, 0)−
d2
dt2
ζkkA (0, t)
∣∣∣
t=0
d2
dt2
ζkkA (0, t)
∣∣∣
t=0
=− bke−
T |αk|2
2F+1 +
2(1− µ)
F
e−
T |αk|2
2F , (A6)
with x̂3 = b̂3 + b̂
†
3 in Fig. 3 and bk =
8
(2F+1)3
(
(2F + 1)2 − µ(2F 2 + 3F + 1) + µT |αk|2
)
; hence,
Vy =
L00
ζ00A (0)
=
1
ζ00A (0)
(
bke
−T |αk|22F+1 − 2(1− µ)
F
e−
T |αk|2
2F
)
− 1. (A7)
Note that for α = 0, Vy = 1 is obtained.
3. Co-variance between Alice and Bob (Vxy)
By definition, the co-variance between Alice and Bob is given by:
Vxy = tr(ρ̂03x̂0x̂3) =
1
4PPS
3∑
k=0
3∑
l=0
NklSkl, (A8)
where Nkl := tr(|ψk〉0〈ψl|x̂0) is given in Eq. (A12) and
Skl =tr(Ω̂
kl
3 x̂3)
=− i d
dt
ζklA (0, t)
∣∣∣
t=0
=
2
√
µ(1− µ)T (αk + α∗l )
(2F + 1)2
e−
Tαkα
∗
l
2F+1 (A9)
One can then conclude that:
Vxy =
2
√
µ(1− µ)T α2
PPS(2F + 1)2
(
ω1 cosh(
Tα2
2F + 1
)− ω2 sinh( Tα
2
2F + 1
) + ω3 cos(
Tα2
2F + 1
)− ω4 sin( Tα
2
2F + 1
)
)
, (A10)
where
ω1 =
√
λ0
λ1
+
√
λ2
λ3
, ω2 =
√
λ1
λ2
+
√
λ3
λ0
, ω3 =
√
λ0
λ1
−
√
λ2
λ3
, ω4 =
√
λ1
λ2
−
√
λ3
λ0
. (A11)
It is seen that for α = 0, Vxy = 0 is obtained.
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In the calculations of Gkl and Nkl we made use of the following identities:
|ψ0〉 =1
2
[|φ0〉+ eipi/4|φ1〉+ eipi/2|φ2〉+ e3ipi/4|φ3〉]
â|ψ0〉 =α
2
[
eipi/4
√
λ0
λ1
|φ0〉+ eipi/2
√
λ1
λ2
|φ1〉+ ei3pi/4
√
λ2
λ3
|φ2〉 −
√
λ3
λ0
|φ3〉
]
â2|ψ0〉 =α
2
2
[
eipi/2
√
λ0
λ2
|φ0〉+ ei3pi/4
√
λ1
λ3
|φ1〉 −
√
λ2
λ0
|φ2〉 − eipi/4
√
λ3
λ1
|φ3〉
]
|ψ1〉 =1
2
[|φ0〉+ ei3pi/4|φ1〉+ ei3pi/2|φ2〉+ eipi/4|φ3〉]
â|ψ1〉 =α
2
[
ei3pi/4
√
λ0
λ1
|φ0〉+ ei3pi/2
√
λ1
λ2
|φ1〉+ eipi/4
√
λ2
λ3
|φ2〉 −
√
λ3
λ0
|φ3〉
]
â2|ψ1〉 =α
2
2
[
ei3pi/2
√
λ0
λ2
|φ0〉+ eipi/4
√
λ1
λ3
|φ1〉 −
√
λ2
λ0
|φ2〉 − ei3pi/4
√
λ3
λ1
|φ3〉
]
|ψ2〉 =1
2
[|φ0〉+ e−i3pi/4|φ1〉+ eipi/2|φ2〉+ e−ipi/4|φ3〉]
â|ψ2〉 =α
2
[
e−i3pi/4
√
λ0
λ1
|φ0〉+ eipi/2
√
λ1
λ2
|φ1〉+ eipi/4
√
λ2
λ3
|φ2〉 −
√
λ3
λ0
|φ3〉
]
â2|ψ2〉 =α
2
2
[
eipi/2
√
λ0
λ2
|φ0〉+ e−ipi/4
√
λ1
λ3
|φ1〉 −
√
λ2
λ0
|φ2〉 − e−i3pi/4
√
λ3
λ1
|φ3〉
]
|ψ3〉 =1
2
[|φ0〉+ e−ipi/4|φ1〉+ ei3pi/2|φ2〉+ e−3ipi/4|φ3〉]
â|ψ3〉 =α
2
[
e−ipi/4
√
λ0
λ1
|φ0〉+ ei3pi/2
√
λ1
λ2
|φ1〉+ e−i3pi/4
√
λ2
λ3
|φ2〉 −
√
λ3
λ0
|φ3〉
]
â2|ψ3〉 =α
2
2
[
ei3pi/2
√
λ0
λ2
|φ0〉+ e−i3pi/4
√
λ1
λ3
|φ1〉 −
√
λ2
λ0
|φ2〉 − e−ipi/4
√
λ3
λ1
|φ3〉
]
(A12)
Appendix B: Calculation of Holevo Information
For a CM in the following standard symplectic form
VAB =
(
Vx1 Vxyσz
Vxyσz Vy1
)
, (B1)
the Holevo information is upper bounded by:
χEB = g(Λ1) + g(Λ2)− g(Λ3), (B2)
where g(x) = (x+12 ) log2(
x+1
2 ) − x−12 log2 x−12 and Λ1/2 =
√(
W ±√W 2 − 4D2 )/2 and Λ3 = √VxD/Vy , with W =
V 2x + V
2
y − 2V 2xy and D = VxVy − V 2xy . Note that one can also take into account imperfect effects of the homodyne receiver.
We however assume an ideal homodyne detection in this work.
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